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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right pursuant to Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Rule 3 (a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is brought by an attorney who rendered services that resulted in his client being 
granted a bifurcated divorce and issues of custody and property division were reserved for 
triaL The client secured other representation and the attorney withdrew with the client 
promising in writing to pay the fourth, and final, bill for services renderedo When the client 
reneged the attorney used the authority under the written retainer agreement to lien on the 
client's undivided one-half interest in the marital home. The client settled the case by taking 
liquid marital assets and his spouse took the marital home knowing the attorney's lien was 
attached. Notice of the lien had been served earlier on the attorney for the spouses and the 
district court judge. After the decree entered the client's spouse show caused the client and 
his former attorney to release the lien. Neither spouse appeared at the show cause hearing, 
no papers or brief were served on the attorney with the order to show cause. The lien was 
ordered released, no record was made of the proceedings, the final order contained no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law and no separate findings or conclusions were entered. 
•• • 
m 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I 
Whether the district court was required to make a contemporaneous record of the 
proceedings that resulted in the vacation of Appellant's statutory attorney's lien. 
ISSUE II 
Whether the district court is required to enter supporting findings of fact and 
conclusions of law before ordering the vacation of an attorney's lien on the client's 
undivided one-half interest in the marital home. 
ISSUE III 
Whether Appellant was denied due process when his pre-existing lien was vacated 
without service on Appellant of any of the documents filed with the court setting forth 
the substantive grounds for the hearing or upon which the Court relied in deciding to 
vacate Appellant's lien. 
ISSUE IV 
Whether UC 78-51-41 guarantees an attorney's statutory right to impress a lien on real 
property that is the subject of litigation between spouses, and in which the client has a 
joint interest, to assure the attorney will be paid for his services. 
iv 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Brussow was the attorney in a divorce for Appellee Ross Kirkley. Brussow 
provided legal services that included discovery depositions of the parties and attending the 
first pre-trial conference where a bi-furcated divorce decree was obtained for Ross Kirkley. 
Contested issues like property division and child custody remained for trial and Kirkley had 
paid three of Brussow?s interim billings. Appellee Ross Kirkley hired another attorney and 
Brussow withdrew as counsel. 
Although promising in writitng to incremently pay Brussow's final bill, Ross Kirkley did 
not. Brussow filed an attorney's lien on the marital real property in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office and also filed the lien and notice thereof with the clerk of the district court 
in reference to the divorce case. Copies of the notice and lien were served on the parties to 
the divorce and a courtesy copy was served on the district court judge. Counsel for 
Kirkley's spouse withdrew and other counsel was substituted for Sherrie Kirkley. 
Subsequently, a settlement was reached and final decree of divorce divided the marital 
property, Sherrie Kirkley took the marital residence with the attorney's lien attached and the 
decree required Kirkley to do what was necessary to remove that lien. Ross Kirkley failed to 
comply with this provision of the decree and his spouse obtained an order to show cause. A 
copy of the order to show cause was served on Attorney Brussow making him a party, but no 
copy of the motion and/or memorandum filed to obtain the order to show cause or any other 
supporting documents were served on Brussow who personally appeared as required. Ross 
Kirkley did not appear contrary to the order and was not examined under oath as to the 
premises in contention. Sherrie Kirkley did not appear. 
The district court ordered the attorney's lien released. Brussow objected on grounds of the 
denial of due process, refusal of Ross Kirkley to appear contrary to the order to show cause 
and for the court's failure to comply with existing law. The court took no record of the 
proceedings. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered and the final order that 
vacated the attorney's lien set forth no supporting facts or law. 
Brussow appealed. 
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ISSUE I 
Whether the district court was required to make a contemporaneous record of the 
proceedings that resulted in the vacation of Appellant's statutory attorney's lien. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Failure or refusal of the district court to record proceedings held in open court that affected 
the substantial rights of an aggrieved person is unconstitutional and the decision arising from 
such proceedings likewise violates the Utah Constitution and should be reversed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review applied to a question of law is de novo with no deference to the 
lower court. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 770 P2d 163 (Ut App 1989). 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
APPLICABLE LAW 
District courts of this state are courts of record under the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, Art. 
VIII, § 1, UC 78-1-2 (1987). Judges are required to make a verbatim transcription or 
recording of the whole proceeding. UC 78-56-1.1 & CJA R 3-304(3)(A) & 4-201. A 
record of all its official proceedings should be made and, in a variety of contexts, Utah 
appellate courts have noted the necessity of a complete recording of court proceedings. 
Briggs v Holcomb, 740 P2d 281, 282-83 (Utah App 1987)(courts of record should make 
complete record of all proceedings, even those which may not seem critical), Birch v Birch, 
111 P2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App 1989); State v Suarez, 793 P2d 934, 936 n3 (Utah App 
1990). This precept has even been applied "to conferences in chambers as well as courtroom 
proceedings." Onyeabor v Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P2d 525, 527 (Utah App 1990), Liska v 
Liska, 902 P2d 644, 649 (Utah App 1995) (when judicial officers confer pursuant to 
UCCJA, verbatim record of discussion is preferable to written summary). Liska cites Yost v 
Johnson, 591 A2d 178 (Del 1991) as persuasive authority, teaching that the constitutional 
2 
under-pinnings of due process and sound legal logic that assure fundamental fairness are 
abrogated when a tribunal fails to record the communications that comprise the proceedings 
that impact on a right of an affected party. 
The role of the appellate court is to sift the parties1 arguments in light of "the facts found by 
the trial court and square them with the law." State v Vigil, 815 P2d 1296, 97 (1991). 
DISCUSSION 
The district court prevents review by the appellate court to the conduct of the district 
court when no record is made of the proceedings in open court that stripped away 
appellant's statutory rights. Likewise, the appellate arguments of the parties are stifled 
where there is no accurate record on which to rely for support. This unconstitutional 
error by the district court renders the appellate court unable to conduct a meaningful 
review of the decision below and of issues relevant to the claim of appeal. Tolman v 
Salt Lake, 818 P2d 23; 169 Ut Adv Rep 40. 
Violation of the requirement that an accurate verbatim and contemporaneous record of the 
proceedings before a tribunal be made paves the way for the abuse of a litigant's 
constitutional right to fundamental fairness, leaves the reviewing court with little alternative 
but to reverse the unsubstantiated decision that deprives the affected party of a full and fair 
chance to appeal, and unfairly prejudices the appellant. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For non-compliance with the Utah Constitution and applicable statutes that require the 
taking and provision of a contemporaneous record, the decision below should be reversed. 
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ISSUE II 
Whether the district court is required to enter supporting findings of fact and 
conclusions of law before ordering the vacation of an attorney's lien on the client's 
undivided one-half interest in the marital home. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A district court may not enter a final order or judgment that deprives an affected party of a 
right without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law that support the decision and 
that permit the appellate court to review the decision for error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review applied to a question of law is de novo with no deference to the 
lower court. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 770 P2d 163 (Ut App 1989). 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The trial court may not render a decision abrogating the rights of the affected person, made a 
party to the proceedings, without the district court stating its findings of fact either 
separately or within its written order/judgment. The law is well settled that it is the duty of 
the trial judge in contested matters to find facts upon all material issues submitted for 
decision. Baird v Upper Canal Irrigation Co, 70 Utah 57; 257 P 1060, Boyer CovLignell, 
567 P2d 1112 (Ut 1977), URCP 52(a). 
URCP 52(a) provides in pertinent part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgments shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
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The role of the appellate court is to sift the parties* arguments in light of "the facts found by 
the trial court and square them with the law." State v Vigil, supra, p 97. 
DISCUSSION 
A party must be afforded "rudimentary due process" before a judicial officer. That is: 
• (i) timely written notice detailing the reasons for proposed action; 
• (ii) an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by being 
allowed to present in person witnesses, evidence, and arguments; 
• (iii) a hearing examiner other than the individual who made the decision or determination 
under review (unbiased and neutral); and 
• (iv) a written, although relatively informal, statement of findings 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254 (1969), Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 US 280; 90 SCt 1026; 
25 LEd2d 307 (1970), Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 US 471; 92 SCt 2593; 33 LEd2d 484 (1972), 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 786; 93 SCt 1756,1761-1762, 36 LEd2d 656, 664 (1973). 
As discussed above, the district court made no record of the proceedings for the appellate 
court to review. In order for the appellate court to deduce whether the district court 
complied with the law in reaching a rational decision or, in the alternative, whether such was 
arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonable, findings of fact and conclusions of law must be 
stated and entered. Not only are there no findings or legal conclusions supporting the lower 
court's decision, no record was made through which the appellate court may sift to search for 
findings and conclusions to divine a rationale for the district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The absence of the findings of fact and conclusions of law is contrary to precedent, the 
mandate of the Supreme Court and the intent expressed by URCP 52(a). Rudimentary due 
process protections were denied Appellant by the lower court when no findings or legal 
conclusions were stated or entered and the final order/judgment entered on or about 12 
August 1996 is devoid of such support. The decision below should be reversed. 
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ISSUE III 
Whether Appellant was denied due process when his pre-existing lien was vacated 
without service on Appellant of any of the documents filed with the court setting forth 
the substantive grounds for the hearing or upon which the Court relied in deciding to 
vacate Appellant's lien. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and fundamental principles of due process fairness 
require the party be served all papers filed with a court that is to determine the rights of the 
affected party. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of an appeal issue that addresses an erroneous conclusion of law is 
de novo. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 770 P2d 163 (Ut App 1989). 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Elements of "Rudimentary due process" set forth above include an affected person being 
extended an effective opportunity to defend. Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 
339 US 306; 70 SCt 652; 94LEd 865 (1950) likewise interprets the U S Constitution, Amend 
14 to require not merely notice but a real opportunity to defend. The Utah Supreme Court 
effectuated the fundamental fairness embodied in constitutional due process by 
promulgating URCP 5 which requires every paper filed with a court be served upon a 
material party to the proceedings. 
DISCUSSION 
It is clear from the contents of the district file below that the absence of a certificate of 
service assuring that Brussow was served papers supporting the order to show cause 
substantiates none were served. Only the order to show cause was served and this order 
compelled Brussow to appear before the district court regarding the attorney's lien that he 
had filed on Ross Kirkley's undivided one-half interest in the marital home before Ross and 
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Sherrie Kirkley divided the marital assets and Sherrie Kirkley took the marital home with 
full knowledge that a valid attorney's lien was attached to the half that Ross Kirkley 
negotiated to Sherrie Kirkley for other assets. The court file substantiates this. 
The motion, memorandum or other papers that were filed with the court were not served on 
Brussow and he was denied the opportunity to rebut whatever facts or legal precedent the 
moving party submitted to the court and an opportunity to research and submit rebutting 
precedent to the court. 
When the premises were stated to the district court at the show cause hearing and Brussow 
was initially apprised of the argument of the moving party since no brief was served, he did 
what he could to defend his lien but his oral response was interrupted and cut-off. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Brussow was denied fundamental due process notice and a full fair opportunity to defend by 
the moving party's failure or refusal to serve the motion, memorandum or other papers that 
were submitted to the district court to obtain the order to show cause. CJA 4-501 Motions. 
The denial of due process necessitates the reversal of the district court order releasing the 
attorney's lien. 
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ISSUE rv 
Whether UC 78-51-41 guarantees an attorney's statutory right to impress a lien on real 
property that is the subject of litigation between spouses, and in which the client has a 
joint interest, to assure the attorney will be paid for his services. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The UC 78-51-41 attorney's lien on property that is the subject of litigation should not be 
released where settlement between the parties results in the evasion of the protection the 
Legislature intended in UC 78-51-41 to assure the attorney will be paid for his services. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of an appeal issue that addresses an erroneous conclusion of law is 
de novo. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 770 P2d 163 (Ut App 1989). 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
UC 78-51-41 states in pertinent part: 
. . . the attorney who is so employed has a lien upon the clients' cause of action 
or counter-claim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision or 
judgment in the clients' favor AND TO THE PROCEEDS THEREOF IN 
WHOSOEVER HANDS THEY MAY COME, AND CANNOT BE AFFECTED 
BY ANY SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES BEFORE OR AFTER 
JUDGMENT. Any written employment agreement shall contain a statement 
that the attorney has a lien upon the clients' cause of action or counter-claim. 
Hampton v Hampton, 85 Utah 338; 39 P2d 703, 706 (1935) held under an identical 
predecessor statute to UC 78-51-41 that the statute regarding attorney's liens applied to all 
causes of action, including those resulting in divorce. 
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DISCUSSION 
By enacting UC 78-51-41 the legislature intended to protect attorneys who represent the 
legal interests of their clients through litigation, even in divorces, from the collusion and/or 
remorse of the parties by mandating that the attorney's lien "cannot be affected by any 
settlement between the parties before or after judgment." Simply, the legislature 
recognized the value of the services of an attorney in moving a case toward a conclusion and 
mandated that parties in an action could not collude to divide the marital estate in a manner 
to defraud an attorney out of his fees if that attorney represented one of the parties in the 
divorce,, Otherwise the litigants could dis-joint the real property to evade the lien, by 
swapping other property to move the real property to the party who was not represented by 
the lienor. Defendant's Attorney not only has a lien on any settlement in the clients' favor 
but also has a valid lien upon " . . . the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may 
come." Logically this would include the opposing party in the litigation to divide the 
marital estate in which the client had a one-half undivided interest and one party took real 
property knowing the lien for attorney was attached and allowing the other party to settle the 
case for liquid assets. Where the court had notice of the lien provisions for an escrow with 
the court clerk would eliminate the fraudulent transfer of assets to evade the lien. Likewise 
the court could have found Ross Kirkley in contempt of court for refusing to appear and 
respond to the order to show cause. 
It is hornbook law that each party in a marriage has an undivided one-half interest in all real 
and personal property acquired during marriage. Therefore, unlike a tort or contract case 
where one party wins entirely and the other party loses, in a divorce decree property is split 
and both parties are favored by the proceeds divided in the decree, usually by trading an 
interest in one piece of property for another with the adversary. In this case Sherrie Kirkley 
bargained to take the marital residence with the lien and Ross Kirkley agreed to satisfy the 
lien of which both of them was aware0 
Defendant contracted in writing with his attorney, Brussow, and gave a lien on Ross 
Kirkley ?s undivided one-half interest in the marital assets in the written contract for legal 
9 
services to obtain legal services regarding his divorce. The lien was served well before the 
stipulation to settle was entered on the record. The district court file below inarguably 
establishes that the parties below, their attorneys and the court were given notice of the 
attorney's lien on the marital home well before the marital property was divided by the 
decree that required Ross Kirkley to use his best efforts to clear-up the attorney's lien within 
90 days, on 19 June 1996. Ross Kirkley did not pay-off the lien and did not appear at the 
show cause so his examination under oath could not be had. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff and Defendant acted to circumvent the protection extended to Appellant by the 
Legislature and expressed in UC 78-51-41. Plaintiff was no bona fide purchaser for value 
and she knowingly took defendants one half interest in the marital property with notice of 
defendants attorney's lien. Defendant promised in writing to incrementally pay his 
outstanding attorney fees, but did not. Sherrie Kirkley could have required Ross Kirkley to 
satisfy the attorney's lien before the decree of divorce incorporating the disposition of the 
marital property was entered, but did not. 
Appellant's timely filed and noticed attorney's lien should not be defeated "by any settlement 
of the parties before or after judgment" that evades the UC 78-51-41 protection. The district 
court's release of the attorney lien to counsel's detriment, rather than finding defendant in 
contempt of court for not appearing and responding to the court's order, is contrary to statute 
and the Legislative intent and should be reversed. 
/^January 1997 / / 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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